Title: On Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity

Speaker: Ritesh Jain, University of Liverpool

Area: Economics

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Abstract:

Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity, due to Bergemann and Morris (2008) and Oury and Tercieux (2012), fully characterizes the class of social choice functions that are implementable in interim rationalizable strategies by a mechanism that has a pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium.

Speaker Profile:

Prof. Ritesh Jain Lecturer at the University of Liverpool Management School. He received Ph.D. from the Department of Economics, at The Ohio State University. His primary fields of interest are implementation theory, mechanism design, and experimental economics. Previously, He was an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taiwan.

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