

**Title: Affirmative Action Policies in School Choice: Immediate versus Deferred Acceptance**

**Speaker: Prof. Szilvia Pápai, Concordia University**

**Area: Economics**

**Date: 19.02.2026, Venue: P22 @ 4PM**

**Abstract:**

We study three basic welfare axioms for school choice mechanisms with a reserve or quota-based affirmative action policy, namely non-wastefulness, respecting the affirmative action policy, and minimal responsiveness, and show that none of the previously proposed mechanisms satisfy all of them. We demonstrate that, together with an essential fairness requirement, these three welfare axioms are compatible by constructing a new mechanism which issues immediate acceptances to minority students for minority reserve seats and otherwise uses deferred acceptance. We analyze compatibilities, tradeoffs, and implications concerning the three basic welfare axioms, fairness, and incentive properties.

**Speaker Profile:**



Szilvia Pápai is an Associate Professor of Economics at Concordia University and a Research Fellow at CIREQ. Her research spans matching theory, market design, game theory, and social choice. She earned her PhD from Caltech and previously held a Canada Research Chair in Economic Theory. She is also a Fellow of the Hungarian Society of Economics and has held academic positions across the United States, Europe, and Turkey. Her work has appeared in leading journals, including *Econometrica*, the *Journal of Economic Theory*, and *Games and Economic Behavior*. In addition to her research contributions, she has provided substantial professional service through editorial roles at *Games and Economic Behavior*, *Social Choice and Welfare*, and the *Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design*.

**Webpage Link:** <https://sites.google.com/site/szilviapapai/home?authuser=0>