19 JANUARY, 2023: Prof. T.E.S. Raghavan, from the University of Illinois in Chicago, will conduct a research seminar titled ‘Shapley value and the nucleolus’ on 24 January 2023. The seminar, to be hosted by the Research and Publications Office at IIMB, will begin at 11.30 am at Classroom P21.
There are two unique solution concepts for all cooperative games with transferable utility (CTU games). One is axiomatically motivated and is called the Shapley value. The other is the nucleolus, which is arrived at iteratively by a series of linear programmes. For any generic CTU game, the sheer data defining the game can grow exponential if we have to define it for all possible coalitions. This paper intends to show how efficient algorithms to compute the nucleolus would be possible for some structure CTU games.
Prof. Raghavan is an emeritus professor at the University of Illinois in Chicago, and a pioneer and globally renowned authority in the field of game theory. A Ph.D. from Indian Statistical Institute, his research interests are in game theory, linear and non-linear programming, matrix theory, applied statistics, and operations research. He has published more than 60 remarkable papers in the fields of stochastic games, dynamic games, and cooperative games. "Stochastic and Differential Games: Theory and Numerical Methods" and "Stochastic Games and Related Topics" are some of the books authored by Prof. Raghavan. He has been running a Gurukulam in Game theory in Pulavanur, a village in Tamil Nadu.
His profile can be accessed at https://mscs.uic.edu/profiles/ter/
19 JANUARY, 2023: Prof. T.E.S. Raghavan, from the University of Illinois in Chicago, will conduct a research seminar titled ‘Shapley value and the nucleolus’ on 24 January 2023. The seminar, to be hosted by the Research and Publications Office at IIMB, will begin at 11.30 am at Classroom P21.
There are two unique solution concepts for all cooperative games with transferable utility (CTU games). One is axiomatically motivated and is called the Shapley value. The other is the nucleolus, which is arrived at iteratively by a series of linear programmes. For any generic CTU game, the sheer data defining the game can grow exponential if we have to define it for all possible coalitions. This paper intends to show how efficient algorithms to compute the nucleolus would be possible for some structure CTU games.
Prof. Raghavan is an emeritus professor at the University of Illinois in Chicago, and a pioneer and globally renowned authority in the field of game theory. A Ph.D. from Indian Statistical Institute, his research interests are in game theory, linear and non-linear programming, matrix theory, applied statistics, and operations research. He has published more than 60 remarkable papers in the fields of stochastic games, dynamic games, and cooperative games. "Stochastic and Differential Games: Theory and Numerical Methods" and "Stochastic Games and Related Topics" are some of the books authored by Prof. Raghavan. He has been running a Gurukulam in Game theory in Pulavanur, a village in Tamil Nadu.
His profile can be accessed at https://mscs.uic.edu/profiles/ter/