IIMB’s Research & Publications office to host Prof. Anujit Chakraborty on 27 July
24 July, 2018: IIMB’s Research and Publications office will host a seminar on ‘Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma Games’ by Prof. Anujit Chakraborty, University of California, Davis, on July 27 (Friday) in Classroom K-21.
Prof. Chakraborty’s paper provides a systematic analysis of how the shadow of the future might affect cooperation in Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (FRPD) games. He finds that the experimental discount factor, which is a measure of the shadow of the future in our study is a significant determinant of both first and last round behavior, with very opposite directional effects. The evidence calls for a theory that can jointly accommodate subjects playing egoistic reputation equilibrium, as well as those who respond to altruistic motives. He tests three popular altruistic motives in a horse race to match the data.
For speaker profile, please click:
http://economics.ucdavis.edu/people/anujit
Title: Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma games
Speaker: Anujit Chakraborty, University of California, Davis
Date: 27.07.2018
Venue: K21 @ 2.30PM
IIMB’s Research & Publications office to host Prof. Anujit Chakraborty on 27 July
24 July, 2018: IIMB’s Research and Publications office will host a seminar on ‘Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma Games’ by Prof. Anujit Chakraborty, University of California, Davis, on July 27 (Friday) in Classroom K-21.
Prof. Chakraborty’s paper provides a systematic analysis of how the shadow of the future might affect cooperation in Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (FRPD) games. He finds that the experimental discount factor, which is a measure of the shadow of the future in our study is a significant determinant of both first and last round behavior, with very opposite directional effects. The evidence calls for a theory that can jointly accommodate subjects playing egoistic reputation equilibrium, as well as those who respond to altruistic motives. He tests three popular altruistic motives in a horse race to match the data.
For speaker profile, please click:
http://economics.ucdavis.edu/people/anujit
Title: Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma games
Speaker: Anujit Chakraborty, University of California, Davis
Date: 27.07.2018
Venue: K21 @ 2.30PM