On the Link between Tax Non-Compliance and Embezzlement: Experimental Evidence
Developing countries are typically characterized by “hard-to-tax” sectors (e.g. small/informal businesses or subsistence farmers), due the lack of information on revenues. This lack of information poses substantial enforcement problems and provides ample opportunity for tax non-compliance. In such a context, voluntary tax compliance can be instrumental for increased revenue mobilization.
On the Link between Tax Non-Compliance and Embezzlement: Experimental Evidence
| Project Team: | Ritwik Banerjee, Amadou Boly and Robert Gillanders |
| Sponsor: | IIM Bangalore |
| Project Status: | Ongoing (Initiated in September 2018) |
| Area: | Economics & Social Science |
| Abstract: | Developing countries are typically characterized by “hard-to-tax” sectors (e.g. small/informal businesses or subsistence farmers), due the lack of information on revenues. This lack of information poses substantial enforcement problems and provides ample opportunity for tax non-compliance. In such a context, voluntary tax compliance can be instrumental for increased revenue mobilization. |