Research has generated valuable knowledge about chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) communication with infomediaries, such as analysts and journalists. However, the extant literature neglects the fact that other top executives—especially chief financial officers (CFOs)—also influence infomediaries, perhaps in different ways than CEOs. Moreover, CEOs might need to align their communication with these executives in order to sway infomediaries’ evaluations. We combine social role theory and language expectancy theory to introduce the concept of role consistency of executive strategic public language and the idea that audiences perceive certain dimensions of language to confirm the CEO’s role but to disconfirm the CFO’s role, and vice-versa. Specifically, we hypothesize that infomediaries evaluate a firm more positively the more its CEO and CFO use language that is consistent with infomediaries’ expectations for the respective roles; that infomediaries respond more negatively when executives use role-disconfirming language than they respond positively when executives use role-confirming language; that the effects of the role consistency of CEOs’ and CFOs’ language on infomediaries’ evaluations mutually reinforce each other; and that these effects are strongest at the beginning of executives’ tenures. Analyses of data from 14,806 quarterly earnings calls between S&P 500 executives and securities analysts support our theorizing.