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Research & Publications Office to host seminar on ‘Optimal Allowance with Limited Auditing Capacity’ on 7 August

The talk will be delivered by Dr. Albin Erlanson, University of Essex

4 August, 2025, Bengaluru: The Office of Research and Publications (R&P) will host a seminar on, ‘Optimal Allowance with Limited Auditing Capacity’, to be led by Dr. Albin Erlanson, University of Essex (Economics area), at 5 pm on 7th August 2025, at P22.

Abstract: The researchers analyze the mechanism-design problem of a principal allocating amounts of a perfectly divisible good to n agents, each of whom desires as much of the good as possible. The principal has an ideal allocation for each agent, which is private information held by that agent. The principal has access to an auditing technology that allows her to perfectly uncover the private information of any k<n of the agents. The researchers present a tractable approach to solve for the principal's optimal mechanism, which combines targeted random audits with allocative distortions to ensure compliance. Agents whose reported type falls above a cutoff enter a pool for random audits. The allocation to audited agents coincides with the principal's ideal. For unaudited agents, upward distortions reward conservative reporting, while downward distortions discipline over-reporting.

Speaker Profile: Dr. Albin Erlanson is a Lecturer (Assistant Professor) at University of Essex.

Webpage Link: https://erlanson.weebly.com/ 

 

Add to Calendar 2025-08-07 05:30:00 2025-08-05 19:20:24 Research & Publications Office to host seminar on ‘Optimal Allowance with Limited Auditing Capacity’ on 7 August The talk will be delivered by Dr. Albin Erlanson, University of Essex 4 August, 2025, Bengaluru: The Office of Research and Publications (R&P) will host a seminar on, ‘Optimal Allowance with Limited Auditing Capacity’, to be led by Dr. Albin Erlanson, University of Essex (Economics area), at 5 pm on 7th August 2025, at P22. Abstract: The researchers analyze the mechanism-design problem of a principal allocating amounts of a perfectly divisible good to n agents, each of whom desires as much of the good as possible. The principal has an ideal allocation for each agent, which is private information held by that agent. The principal has access to an auditing technology that allows her to perfectly uncover the private information of any k<n of the agents. The researchers present a tractable approach to solve for the principal's optimal mechanism, which combines targeted random audits with allocative distortions to ensure compliance. Agents whose reported type falls above a cutoff enter a pool for random audits. The allocation to audited agents coincides with the principal's ideal. For unaudited agents, upward distortions reward conservative reporting, while downward distortions discipline over-reporting. Speaker Profile: Dr. Albin Erlanson is a Lecturer (Assistant Professor) at University of Essex. Webpage Link: https://erlanson.weebly.com/    IIM Bangalore IIM Bangalore communications@iimb.ac.in Asia/Kolkata public
7 Aug 2025

Research & Publications Office to host seminar on ‘Optimal Allowance with Limited Auditing Capacity’ on 7 August

Add to Calendar 2025-08-07 05:30:00 2025-08-05 19:20:24 Research & Publications Office to host seminar on ‘Optimal Allowance with Limited Auditing Capacity’ on 7 August The talk will be delivered by Dr. Albin Erlanson, University of Essex 4 August, 2025, Bengaluru: The Office of Research and Publications (R&P) will host a seminar on, ‘Optimal Allowance with Limited Auditing Capacity’, to be led by Dr. Albin Erlanson, University of Essex (Economics area), at 5 pm on 7th August 2025, at P22. Abstract: The researchers analyze the mechanism-design problem of a principal allocating amounts of a perfectly divisible good to n agents, each of whom desires as much of the good as possible. The principal has an ideal allocation for each agent, which is private information held by that agent. The principal has access to an auditing technology that allows her to perfectly uncover the private information of any k<n of the agents. The researchers present a tractable approach to solve for the principal's optimal mechanism, which combines targeted random audits with allocative distortions to ensure compliance. Agents whose reported type falls above a cutoff enter a pool for random audits. The allocation to audited agents coincides with the principal's ideal. For unaudited agents, upward distortions reward conservative reporting, while downward distortions discipline over-reporting. Speaker Profile: Dr. Albin Erlanson is a Lecturer (Assistant Professor) at University of Essex. Webpage Link: https://erlanson.weebly.com/    IIM Bangalore IIM Bangalore communications@iimb.ac.in Asia/Kolkata public

The talk will be delivered by Dr. Albin Erlanson, University of Essex

4 August, 2025, Bengaluru: The Office of Research and Publications (R&P) will host a seminar on, ‘Optimal Allowance with Limited Auditing Capacity’, to be led by Dr. Albin Erlanson, University of Essex (Economics area), at 5 pm on 7th August 2025, at P22.

Abstract: The researchers analyze the mechanism-design problem of a principal allocating amounts of a perfectly divisible good to n agents, each of whom desires as much of the good as possible. The principal has an ideal allocation for each agent, which is private information held by that agent. The principal has access to an auditing technology that allows her to perfectly uncover the private information of any k<n of the agents. The researchers present a tractable approach to solve for the principal's optimal mechanism, which combines targeted random audits with allocative distortions to ensure compliance. Agents whose reported type falls above a cutoff enter a pool for random audits. The allocation to audited agents coincides with the principal's ideal. For unaudited agents, upward distortions reward conservative reporting, while downward distortions discipline over-reporting.

Speaker Profile: Dr. Albin Erlanson is a Lecturer (Assistant Professor) at University of Essex.

Webpage Link: https://erlanson.weebly.com/