We track the dividend initiation (DI) decisions from a sample of 6,588 firms that went public during the period 1979-2005 and find that 873 of them initiated dividends. Our primary objective is to determine whether information signaling can explain the DI decision. We find that variables suggested by the dividend-signaling models of John and Williams (1985) and Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) are significant determinants of the DI decision and the associated announcement-period stock price effect. We also find support for the residual, agency, tax, clientele, transaction costs, catering, and life-cycle explanations of dividend policy.
We track the dividend initiation (DI) decisions from a sample of 6,588 firms that went public during the period 1979-2005 and find that 873 of them initiated dividends. Our primary objective is to determine whether information signaling can explain the DI decision. We find that variables suggested by the dividend-signaling models of John and Williams (1985) and Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) are significant determinants of the DI decision and the associated announcement-period stock price effect. We also find support for the residual, agency, tax, clientele, transaction costs, catering, and life-cycle explanations of dividend policy.
