In this study, we analyze the joint pricing and inventory management during new product introduction when product shortage creates additional demand due to hype. We develop a two-period model in which a firm launches its product at the beginning of the first period, before it observes sales in the two periods. The product is successful with an exogenous probability, or unsuccessful with the complementary probability. The hype in the second period is observed only when the product is successful. The firm learns the actual status of the product only after observing the first-period demand. The firm must decide the stocking level and price of the product jointly at the beginning of each of the two periods. In this article, we derive some structural properties of the optimal prices and inventory levels, and show that (i) firms do not always exploit hype, (ii) firms do not always increase the price of a successful product in the second period, (iii) firms may price out an unsuccessful product in the first period if the success probability is above a threshold, and (iv) such a threshold probability is decreasing in the first-period market potential of the successful product