Economics area at IIMB to host seminar on Stability and Evolution of Institutional Designs: Theory and Empirics on 02 July
Prof. Ashutosh Thakur, National University of Singapore, to present research on the theory and empirics of institutional design
30 June, 2026, Bengaluru: The Economics area at IIM Bangalore will host a research seminar on ‘Stability and Evolution of Institutional Designs: Theory and Empirics’, to be delivered by Prof. Ashutosh Thakur, Economics area, National University Singapore. The session is to be held on 02 July 2026, from 4:00 to 05:30 PM, in Classroom K-21 at IIMB.
Abstract:
Many organisations require members to be assigned to positions, such as legislators to committees, executives to roles, or workers to teams. In such settings, the assignment procedure itself becomes an institutional choice shaped by the preferences of the very individuals affected by it. This seminar examines whether members would seek to reform existing assignment procedures by voting in favour of alternative allocations, bringing together insights from matching theory and social choice.
The study introduces the concept of majority stability, institutional stability under majority rule, and compares it with alternative voting rules used to resolve internal conflicts. It demonstrates that institutional stability is weakened when agents have highly correlated preferences over positions, allowing decisive coalitions to emerge and alter the existing allocation. For cases of extreme preference correlation, the research establishes a Chaos Theorem, showing that a majority-approved path can exist from any matching allocation to any other allocation.
At the same time, the study finds that institutions remain robust under intermediate levels of preference correlation when majority rule is applied, in sharp contrast to plurality rule. Given the widespread use of majority and supermajority voting mechanisms in practice, the findings offer a theoretical explanation for the persistence of institutional stability. The seminar will also present empirical evidence by examining the historical evolution of assignment procedures for elite civil servants across Indian states.
Speaker Profile:
Ashutosh Dinesh Thakur is an Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at NUS. Ashutosh holds his Ph.D. in Business Administration (Political Economics) from Stanford University's Graduate School of Business '21 and A.B. with Highest Honors in Economics and certificates in Applied and Computational Mathematics, Political Economy, and Finance from Princeton University '14.
His research applies tools of market design to political economy. He develops tools and techniques in matching theory that can be used in these instances to better understand the problem and to design better mechanisms.
Webpage Link: https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/our-people/faculty/thakur-ashutosh-dinesh
Economics area at IIMB to host seminar on Stability and Evolution of Institutional Designs: Theory and Empirics on 02 July
Prof. Ashutosh Thakur, National University of Singapore, to present research on the theory and empirics of institutional design
30 June, 2026, Bengaluru: The Economics area at IIM Bangalore will host a research seminar on ‘Stability and Evolution of Institutional Designs: Theory and Empirics’, to be delivered by Prof. Ashutosh Thakur, Economics area, National University Singapore. The session is to be held on 02 July 2026, from 4:00 to 05:30 PM, in Classroom K-21 at IIMB.
Abstract:
Many organisations require members to be assigned to positions, such as legislators to committees, executives to roles, or workers to teams. In such settings, the assignment procedure itself becomes an institutional choice shaped by the preferences of the very individuals affected by it. This seminar examines whether members would seek to reform existing assignment procedures by voting in favour of alternative allocations, bringing together insights from matching theory and social choice.
The study introduces the concept of majority stability, institutional stability under majority rule, and compares it with alternative voting rules used to resolve internal conflicts. It demonstrates that institutional stability is weakened when agents have highly correlated preferences over positions, allowing decisive coalitions to emerge and alter the existing allocation. For cases of extreme preference correlation, the research establishes a Chaos Theorem, showing that a majority-approved path can exist from any matching allocation to any other allocation.
At the same time, the study finds that institutions remain robust under intermediate levels of preference correlation when majority rule is applied, in sharp contrast to plurality rule. Given the widespread use of majority and supermajority voting mechanisms in practice, the findings offer a theoretical explanation for the persistence of institutional stability. The seminar will also present empirical evidence by examining the historical evolution of assignment procedures for elite civil servants across Indian states.
Speaker Profile:
Ashutosh Dinesh Thakur is an Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at NUS. Ashutosh holds his Ph.D. in Business Administration (Political Economics) from Stanford University's Graduate School of Business '21 and A.B. with Highest Honors in Economics and certificates in Applied and Computational Mathematics, Political Economy, and Finance from Princeton University '14.
His research applies tools of market design to political economy. He develops tools and techniques in matching theory that can be used in these instances to better understand the problem and to design better mechanisms.
Webpage Link: https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/our-people/faculty/thakur-ashutosh-dinesh